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ARGUMENT
I. THE JUVENILE COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
1.

Appellee, Division of Family and Child Services, hereinafter referred to as "the

Division", argues that because either party is entitled to a trial de novo after the informal
proceeding, that it does not matter where the complaint for review is filed. Appellant does not
disagree as to the definition of a trial de novo and that the court conducting the trial de novo is
not bound by the determination below. However, it is axiomatic that the court conducting the
trial de novo must have subject matter jurisdiction to accept the case. Sheppick v. Albertson's,
Inc., 922 P.2d 769,775 (Utah, 1996); Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d
1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1993.)
2.

If we follow the Division's logic and return as if the case was beginning over

again at the point when the Division had first taken its action, then we must look for the source
of judicial subject matter jurisdiction over the Division action at that point in time.
3.

The Division made a substantiated finding of abuse or neglect pursuant to U.C.A.

§62A-4a-202.3 and §62A-4a-409 and was obligated by U.C.A. §62A-4a-116.5(l)(a) to notify
Appellant of the results of its investigation. Appellant's remedy granting him his constitutional
right to due process is provided in U.C.A. §62A-4a-l 16 and U.C.A. §62A-4a-l 16.5, i.e., the right
to request an administrative hearing within 30 days and put the Division to its proof of its
allegations. U.C.A. §62A-4a-116.5(4)(a). Failure to request the administrative hearing would
have resulted in the Division findings becoming unappealable. U.C.A. §62A-4a-116.5(l)(f).
The judicial subject matter jurisdiction of this case or controversy at the point in time when the
Division first took its action was exclusively under the Administrative Procedures Act. Neither
the District Court nor the Juvenile Court had subject matter jurisdiction.
1

4.

The only way the District Court gains subject matter jurisdiction in this case is

pursuant to U.C.A. §63-46b-15 which assigns to the District Court the power to review by trial
de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings. Accordingly,
the fact that the administrative hearing occurred in this case is a condition precedent to the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction in the District Court but the right to a trial de novo from
final agency action resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings relieves the District Court
from being bound by the findings of the administrative court. The applicable standard of proof
and the burden of persuasion to be used before the judicial tribunal must be construed to be as set
forth in U.C.A. §62A-4a-l 16.5(4)(a) which requires the Division to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that child abuse or neglect occurred and
that the person was substantially responsible for the abuse or neglect that occurred.
5.

The Juvenile Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and through §63-46b-15(l)(a)

is delegated specific statutory authority to review by trial de novo substantiated findings of abuse
or neglect pursuant to U.C.A. §62A-4a-116.5. The Juvenile Court is not delegated statutory
authority to review agency action taken pursuant to U.C.A. §62A-4a-202.3 and §62A-4a-409.
Had the legislature intended for the Juvenile Court to have subject matter jurisdiction to review
by trial de novo unsubstantiated findings of abuse or neglect pursuant to U.C.A. §62A-4a116.5, it could easily have done so. It did not and has not and absent a statutory delegation of
jurisdiction, the Juvenile Court was without the power or authority to assume subject matter
jurisdiction in this case.
6.

The only arguable repository of subject matter jurisdiction to review by trial de

novo unsubstantiated findings of abuse or neglect pursuant to U.C.A. §62A-4a-l 16.5 was in the
District Court and it was fatal error for the Juvenile Court to accept subject matter jurisdiction.
2

7.

The Division concedes on page 17 of its brief in the section entitled "Oral

Argument and Published Opinion" that it anticipates that these issues will be raised in the future
and guidance to attorneys litigating these types of cases would be of value. Appellant agrees that
this appeal is on an issue of first impression for the reason that the Division has not previously
sought review of an unsubstantiated finding from the administrative court.
8.

The Division's argument that it is as if the case was beginning over again at the

point when the Division had first taken its action necessarily fails. Otherwise U.C.A. §62A-4a116.5 would be a right without a remedy for the person branded with the Division's substantiated
finding of abuse or neglect and the person would be denied his or her constitutional rights of due
process and equal protection under the law.
9.

The Juvenile Court committed fatal error in hearing this case as it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction and its ruling should be ordered null and void.

n.

THE JUVENILE COURT APPLIED THE INCORRECT STANDARD OF LAW
A.

The Juvenile Court's Conclusion of Law Incorrectly Relies on the Findings
of the Division of Child and Family Services

10.

As set forth within Appellant's brief, the trial court incorrectly determined that the

standard of proof was that the Division acted reasonably when concluding that abuse had
occurred. The State argues that Appellant's argument is so frivolous that it cannot be considered.
However, a plain reading of the Court's conclusions of law shows that the trial court did not
make a conclusion that the Division proved to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that
the abuse occurred rather than the Division acted reasonably. The dichotomy between the trial
court's conclusions of law and the administrative law judge's conclusion provides insight as to
whether or not the trial court applied the correct standard. The trial court's conclusions of law
3

specifically state "1) There was a reasonable basis for the Division of Child and Family Services
to conclude that [S.R.] had been sexually abused; 2) There was a reasonable basis for the
Division of Child and Family Services to conlcude (sic) that Bret Riley was substantially
responsible for the sexual abuse of [S.R.]". (R. 45). Whereas the administrative law judge based
his determination that the findings should be unsubstantiated by stating "[t]he undersigned finds
that the Claimant has failed to meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that
the Respondent is substantially responsible for sexual abuse." The administrative law judge
applied the correct standard—the Division must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the respondent is substantially responsible for sexual abuse. The trial court, however, applied a
lesser standard—that the Division reasonably concluded that the respondent is substantially
responsible for sexual abuse.
11.

If the trial court had applied the correct standard it would have made conclusions

of law that stated the Division has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that abuse
occurred. The trial court did not make such a conclusion, instead concluding that it was
reasonable for the Division to conclude that abuse occurred. The Division's argument that
Appellant's argument is frivolous fails to even address a modicum of the issue raised by
Appellant. That is, why did the trial court fail to make any findings as to the underlying
allegations and fail to make a conclusion that the Division met its burden of proof? The statutory
language specifically requires the Division to prove its case. The Division argues in its brief that
it must prove its case to itself and then show the trial court that it acted reasonably. Of course,
there is no credible support for such an argument. The plain language of the statute requires the
Division to prove by a preponderance of the evidence to the trier of fact that there "is" a
reasonable basis to conclude that abuse occurred, not that there "was" a reasonable basis for the
4

Division to conclude that abuse occurred. Although the Division in a footnote rejects any
distinction between the language as suggested herein, the distinction between the language is the
substantive dispositive issue. That is, if the trial court concluded that the Division met its burden
of proof to convince the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that it "is" reasonable to
conclude that abuse occurred, why then did the trial court make a conclusion of law that stated
there "was" a reasonable basis for the Division to conclude that the abuse occurred. The plain
language of the trial court's order controls the issue. The Division cannot argue that the plain
language of the trial court's order is irrelevant or that the difference between the language in the
court's order and the statute is "so negligible as to be insignificant".
12.

The trial court made a specific change to the proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law submitted by the Division. (Addendum A hereto.)1 Within its proposed
conclusions of law, the Division suggested that the trial court conclude that S.R. was abused by
Bret Riley and that Bret Riley was substantially responsible for the abuse of S.R. The trial court
specifically rejected the Division's proposed conclusions and instead adopted conclusions stating
that the Division acted reasonably in concluding that the abuse had occurred. The trial court thus
applied a standard different than that suggested by the Division and different than that required
by the statute with the result that the trial court applied a standard of a lesser burden of proof for
the Division.

1

Appellant attaches the Division's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law hereto because for some
reason it was not contained within the record below even though it was filed with the trial court as required by the
trial court.

5

B.

By Requiring Appellant to Prove that the Division acted Unreasonably, the
Trial Court Incorrectly Shifted the Burden of Proof to Appellant

13.

The harm resulting from the improper shift of the applicable burden of proof was

the denial of Appellant's constitutional right to the due process of law. As is apparent from the
Findings and Conclusions and Order entered by the Juvenile Court, Appellant was required by
that court to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the determination by the Division in
substantiating findings of abuse or neglect were not reasonable. Rather than the Division being
put to its proof, Appellant was burden with proving a negative.
14.

Appellant was thereby denied equal protection under the law as specified in

U.C.A. §62A-4a-116.5 which required the Division, when its substantiated finding was
challenged, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable basis to
conclude that the child abuse or neglect occurred and the person was substantially responsible for
the abuse or neglect that occurred.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ANY FINDINGS AS TO THE
UNDERLYING ALLEGATIONS

A.

The Trial Court is Required to Determine that the Division of Child and
Family Services Met its Burden of Proof

15.

The Division urges that Appellant is in error when he argues that the trial court is

required to make its own findings that abuse actually occurred instead of determining that the
Division had a reasonable basis to make those conclusions. In support of its argument, the
Division refers the plain language of U.C.A. § 62A-4a-116.5 that states "the division shall prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that: (i) child
6

abuse or neglect, as described in § 62A-4a-116(5) (b), occurred; and (ii) the person was
substantially responsible for the abuse or neglect that occurred." The Division then concludes
that the plain language of the statute allows the trial court to merely adopt and ratify the findings
of the Division. If the Division's interpretation of the plain language of the statute were correct,
then the plain language of the statute would say that the "division shall prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it had a reasonable basis to conclude that abuse had occurred."
Unfortunately for the Division, the plain language of the statute requires it to prove to the court
that there "is" a reasonable basis for the court to conclude that abuse occurred, rather than there
"was" a reasonable basis for the Division to conclude that abuse had occurred. In this case, the
trial court determined that there was a reasonable basis for the Division to conclude that abuse
occurred rather than determining by findings of fact that the Division proved that it "is"
reasonable for the court to conclude that abuse occurred.
16.

The distinction is crucial. U.C.A, § 62A-4a-l 16.5 clearly requires the Division to

be prepared to support its finding of substantiation with evidence sufficient to survive judicial
scrutiny as to substance and reason. The Division's interpretation urged upon this court would
effectively eviscerate the meaning and effect of U.C.A. § 62A-4a-116.5 which guarantees to the
accused his or her constitutional right to due process to hear and confront witnesses and evidence
and to be allowed to present exculpatory evidence and testimony.
17.

The Division fails to address the issue of the clear weight of the evidence against

a finding of abuse except by its blanket argument that the trial court is not required to make a
finding as to credibility. As set forth within Appellant's brief, Appellant presented evidence that
militates against a finding that abuse in fact occurred. A review of the testimony in total shows
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that the Division failed to sustain its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that abuse occurred and that Appellant was substantially responsible for it.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Juvenile Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter and its order
should be held null and void.
Alternatively, the trial court applied the incorrect standard by concluding that it was
reasonable for the Division to conclude that abuse had occurred rather than it was reasonable for
the trial court to conclude that abuse had occurred. The error in the standard of proof requires
remand; and
The trial court erroneously concluded that abuse had occurred because the overwhelming
evidence presented to the trial court supported a conclusion that the abuse did not occur and
could not have occurred. The matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to
conclude that the allegations of abuse are unsubstantiated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 Oth da^fOctobe^ 2 0 0 1 ^

C

- ^ — ^ ^ Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit 1. The Division's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order

KAELA P. JACKSON - 8 8 95
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF - 4 66 6
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 3 66-0250

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
DIVISION OF CHILD AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Petitioner,

) FINDINGS OF FACT,
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
L

v.

)
) Case No. 997188
)

BRET RILEY,

) Judge Robert S. Yeates

Respondent

)

The above-named matter came before the Court on January 10,
2001, for trial on the Division of Child and Family Services'
Petition for Judicial Review of an administrative hearing
decision made on July 17, 2000.

The following parties were

present: Kaela P. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General,
representing the Division of Child and Family Services; Lee
Manley, Division of Child and Family Services; Trena Adams,
Division of Child and Family Services; Bret Riley, respondent;
and Bart Johnson, counsel for Mr. Riley.
MOTION IN LIMINE
Mr. Johnson addressed the Court regarding the Motion in

Limine he filed on January 4, 2 001.

Mr. Johnson argued that

evidence regarding allegations of sexual abuse by Ashley Riley
McQuivy against Bret Riley should be excluded under Rule 404 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The State argued that the evidence

should not be excluded by Rule 404 as it is not being offered to
prove Mr. Riley's character, but only to show what the Division
relied on to find that there was a reasonable basis to conclude
that child abuse occurred.

The Court noted that the issue before

the Court was whether there was a reasonable basis to conclude
that abuse or neglect occurred.

The Court found that the

Division had an obligation to interview Ms. McQuivey and that the
evidence was admissible under Rule 404(3)(b).

The Court denied

the motion.
CASE IN CHIEF
The State made an opening statement, and called the
following witnesses:
1.
2.
3.

Lee Manley
Stacey Riley
Shelly Riley

The State rested.
witnesses:

Mr. Johnson called the following

1.
2.
3.

Brittney Riley
Betty Jo Riley
Ashley Riley McQuivey

4.

Bret Riley

Mr. Johnson rested.

The State and Mr. Johnson made closing

argument to the Court.

2

After considering the evidence presented, cne uourc majces
the following findings of fact by a preponderance of the
evidence:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Bret Riley is the paternal uncle of Stacey Riley.

Stacey Riley is a sixteen year old female child, born on April
24, 1984.
2.

On or about December 25, 1997, Stacey reported to her

mother and father, Shane and Shelly Riley, that on two separate
occasions, Bret Riley inappropriately touched her.
3.

Stacey reported that on December 25, 1997, while at

a family Christmas Party at Bret Riley's home, Mr. Riley
approached Stacey from behind and grabbed her breasts over her
clothing with his hands, squeezing them.

Stacey reported that

she elbowed Mr. Riley in the ribs and ran upstairs to tell her
mother about what had happened.
4.

Stacey also reported that in August, 1997, while

spending the night at Bret Riley's home, she awakened twice in
the middle of the night to find her shirt pulled up around her
neck, her bra unfastened and Mr. Riley rubbing her bare back.
Each time, Stacey wiggled her arms and Mr. Riley left the room.
5.

After Stacey told her parents about the abuse, her

father warned her mother not to discuss the allegations with
anyone.

3

6.

A few days after Stacey reported the abuse to her

parents, Shelly Riley contacted her older daughter, Ashley
McQuivey, and asked her whether Bret Riley had ever touched her
inappropriately.

Ashley came over to her parents' home that

night and told Stacey and her mother about three separate
incidents, occurring when Ashley was between the ages of twelve
and fifteen, when Bret Riley inappropriately touched her. The
first two incidents involved Mr. Riley grabbing Ashley's breasts
over her clothing and squeezing them while the two were
wrestling.

The third incident involved Mr. Riley rubbing

Ashley's knee.
7.

Shelly Riley did not discuss the allegations with

anyone other than her two daughters and her husband.
8.

In January, 1999, Shane and Shelly Riley separated and

in February, 1999, Shelly Riley filed for divorce.
9.

In March, 1999, Stacey Riley came to her mother in

tears, begging her not to make Stacey go to a family birthday
party where Bret Riley would be present.

Shelly Riley contacted

her lawyer, Wendy Lems, and told her of Stacey's concerns. Ms.
Riley also told Ms. Lems about the allegations her daughters had
made against Bret Riley.

Ms. Lems advised Ms. Riley to have her

daughters write letters about what Bret Riley had done to them.
10.

Both Stacey and Ashley wrote letters containing

allegations of inappropriate touching by Bret Riley and Ms. Lems

4

presented them to Commissioner Lisa Jones at a hearing on the
divorce action in the Third District Court.

Commissioner Jones

issued an Order prohibiting contact between Stacey and Bret
Riley.
11.

While the Court's no contact order was in effect,

Stacey reported to her mother that her father had allowed Bret
Riley to have contact with her.

Stacey reported that she was at

her grandparents home visiting her father when Bret Riley
arrived.

After Stacey's father did not ask Mr. Riley to leave,

Stacey got up and left the room.
12.

In June, 1999, Stacey's mother discussed the

allegations against Mr. Riley with Allen Call, a family friend
and West Valley City police officer.

Mr. Call met with Stacey

and advised her to contact law enforcement and make a report of
the allegations.
13.

On or about June 28, 1999, Shelly Riley contacted the

Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department and made a report of the
allegations.
14.

On or about July 14, 1999, Detective Jaroscak, from the

Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department, interviewed Stacey and
Ashley separately at the Children's Justice Center.
15.

During the interview, Ashley told Detective Jaroscak

about the two times Bret Riley grabbed and squeezed her breasts
and about the incident when he rubbed her knee. Ashley became

5

tearful while describing the incidents to Detective Jaroscak.
16.

During Detective Jarcoscak's interview with Stacey, she

told him about the August, 1997 incident when Bret Riley pulled
up her shirt, unfastened her bra, and rubbed her back.

She also

told him about the December, 1997 incident when Mr. Riley grabbed
and squeezed her breasts.
17.

On or about July 20, 1999, Lee Manley, Child Protective

Services investigator, received a referral alleging that Mr.
Riley had sexually abused Stacey Riley.

The referral also

contained information that Mr. Riley had inappropriately touched
Ashley, who was twenty years old at the time of the referral.
18.

During his investigation, Mr. Manley interviewed both

Stacey and Ashley separately regarding the allegations in the
referral.

Mr. Manley informed both girls that he did not need

them to go into the specifics of the allegations as both Stacey
and Ashley had already been interviewed by Detective Jaroscak.
Mr. Manley asked Stacey and Ashley whether anyone had encouraged
them to make up the allegations.

Both girls denied that they had

been encouraged to make up the allegations.
19.

During Mr. Manley's interview with Ashley, she told him

about the two times Bret Riley grabbed her breasts and about the
time he rubbed her knee.

Mr. Manley testified that he found

Ashley's account of the incidents to be credible.
20.

Mr. Johnson, counsel for Bret Riley, posited that Mrs.

6

Riley had influenced Stacey and Ashley or coached them.

However,

no credible evidence was presented to support this claim.

Mr.

Manley interviewed both girls and viewed the videotape of the
interview by Detective Jaroscak.

Mr. Manley testified that he

saw no evidence that the children were coached by their mother,
or anyone else and that he found both Ashley and Stacey to be
credible.
21.

The Court finds that Stacey's account of the incidents

that took place in August and December, 1997 is credible and
consistent.
22.

Based on the above, the Court finds that in August,

1997, Bret Riley pulled up Stacey's shirt while she was sleeping,
unfastened her bra, and rubbed her bare back.

In December, 1997,

Mr. Riley approached Stacey from behind and grabbed her breasts
over her clothing.
Based on the above findings of fact, the Court makes the
following conclusions of law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In August and December, 1997, Stacey Riley was abused,

in that Bret Riley took indecent liberties with her with the
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of either himself
or the child or with the intent to cause substantial bodily pain;
2.

Bret Riley was substantially responsible for the abuse

of Stacey Riley;
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3.

The Division of Child and Family Services acted

reasonably in substantiating referral number: 997188.
Based on the above, the Court makes the following Order:
ORDER
1.

The substantiation made by the Division of Child and

Family Services on referral number: 997188 is upheld.
DATED this

day of

, 2001.
BY THE COURT

HONORABLE ROBERT S. YEATES
Juvenile Court Judge
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I hereby certify that, on this /&
day of
2 001, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Finings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order to the following parties by
first class mail, postage prepaid or personal delivery:
Bart Johnson
Richman and Richman
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Nancy Bender, Hearing Tracker
Department of Human Services
Division of Child and Family Services
120 North 200 West, Suite 225
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Lee Manley, DCFS
Trena Adams, DCFS
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